跳转到文章内容

International trade drives global economic growth, and around 80% of the global movement of goods is via maritime transport (Exhibit 1). Access to the two most important canals in the world has been fundamental to this growth. Today, they are chokepoints.

Exhibit 1: Major Shipping Lanes Around the World

Source: Franklin Templeton Institute

One is the Suez Canal, which the Suez Canal Company of France completed in 1869. It connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, providing the fastest and cheapest route between Europe and Asia. Around 30% of global container traffic, 12%-15% of global trade, passes through this narrow stretch of water, estimated at over US$1 trillion of goods per year.1 That equates to 19,000 ships and revenues of US$9.4 billion in fiscal year 2023.2

In December 2023 and January 2024, the flow of traffic has been reduced by around 42%3 because of the Houthi militants' missile and drone attacks on shipping, supported by Iran. The US and UK militaries are attacking Houthi missile installations in response, but so far without stopping the attacks. The route from Singapore to Rotterdam via Suez is 8,500 nautical miles and takes 26 days. Diverting to the route around the Cape of Good Hope is 11,800 miles and 36 days, adding US$1 million to the fuel costs of a round trip.4

We see indications that European importers are building inventory, effectively choosing “just in case” over “just in time.” Naturally, shipping rates have rocketed; the rates from Shanghai to Europe for example are up 256% since early December.5 Insurance premiums have also surged, adding to costs. The last time the canal was blocked in 2021, Lloyds List estimated that it was holding up US$9.6 billion6 worth of containerized traffic each day. Today, energy prices are clearly at risk, as 9.2 million barrels of oil and 4.1 billion cubic feet of liquified natural gas (LNG)7 flow through the canal each day.

The other is the Panama Canal. Built by the United States in 1914, it negotiates a 26-meter difference in water level between the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans by way of inland lakes and locks. As a result, significant volumes of water are needed to get each vessel across the canal.

Here, the problem is climate change. We are seeing more frequent El Niño weather patterns,8 which result in drought, with a direct impact on the capacity of the canal. Normally it transits 12,000 vessels per year, carrying around 600 million metric tons of goods and earning US$4.97 billion in revenues. The number of ships is now down to 24 per day, a 27% decrease.9 The Panama Canal Authority (PCA) attributes the situation to higher temperatures in the Atlantic, compounded by El Niño and the delayed rainy season. The PCA forecasts the water level in the key Gatun Lake to fall 2% by April 2024, which will have a bearing on the tonnage of vessels that can use the canal, due to their draught.10

While Suez is intensive in commercial goods, food and oil shipments, Panama is the route for over 20% of global soybean exports, and over 15% of maize. It is also the main route for exports of LNG to Asia.11 We have seen shipments diverted to Europe, replacing volumes from the Middle East, and even resulting in lower prices for the European Union.

For US soybean exporters, the Mississippi River is the immediate problem—barge flow restrictions have been more frequent because of lower water levels caused by drought. Close to 60% of US grain exports (wheat, soybeans, corn) travel this route by barge to get to the export terminals in the Gulf of Mexico. The winner here? Potentially Brazilian soybean farmers, who ship to China via the Atlantic route around the Cape of Good Hope. Midwestern farmers can use the railroads going west instead. Or use existing rail routes to Mexico and then divert to the Mexican Pacific ports.

It is too early to say if these bottlenecks will cause inflation. But it would be prudent to treat them as inflationary pressures that risk becoming structural. This is because of the wide variation in the cost increase by subsector, depending on the supply/demand balance in their destination markets and the extent to which longer sea routes impact the availability of empty vessels for the return journey.

Something to watch.



Copyright ©2025 富蘭克林鄧普頓。版權所有。

本文件僅供一般參考。本文件不應被視作個人投資建議或買賣或持有任何基金股份或證券的要約或招攬。有關本文所提及的任何證券的資料並不足以用作制定投資決策。投資涉及風險。投資價值可升或跌,過往業績不代表或不保證將來的表現。投資收益是以資產淨值計算,已考慮股息再投資及資本增長或損失。投資收益以所示貨幣計價,該等貨幣可能是美元/港元以外的貨幣(「外幣」)。因此,以美元/港元交易的投資者需承受美元/港元與外幣之間匯率波動的風險。投資者應仔細閱讀銷售文件,以獲取進一步資料,包括風險因素。

本文件所載的數據、評論、意見、預測及其他資料如有更改恕不另行通知。不保證投資產品目標將會實現,亦不保證所示預測將會實現。表現亦可能受貨幣波動影響。流動性下降或會對資產價格產生不利影響。貨幣波動可能會影響海外投資的價值。如果投資產品投資於新興市場,風險可能高於投資於已發展市場。如果投資產品投資於衍生工具,則需承擔特定風險,這可能會增加投資產品承受的風險水平。如果投資產品投資於特定行業或地區,回報的波動程度可能高於更多元化的投資產品投資。富蘭克林鄧普頓不就使用本文件或其所載的任何評論、意見或估計而導致的任何直接或間接後果性損失承擔任何責任。在未得到富蘭克林鄧普頓的事先書面同意下,不得以任何方式複製、派發或發表本文件。

名稱中包含「(已對沖)」的任何股份類別將嘗試對沖本基金基礎貨幣與股份類別計值貨幣之間的貨幣風險,但不保證可以成功對沖。在某些情況下,投資者可能涉及額外風險。

若閣下對其中任何資料有疑問,謹請與閣下的財務顧問聯絡。

只適用於UCITS基金: 此外,投資者權利概要可從這裡獲得。根據 UCITS 指令,基金/子基金被通知在不同地區進行營銷。 基金/子基金可以使用 UCITS 指令第 93a 條中包含的程序隨時終止任何股份類別和/或子基金的此類通知。

只適用於AIFMD基金:此外,投資者權利摘要可從這裡獲得。根據 AIFMD 指令,基金/子基金被通知在不同地區進行營銷。 基金/子基金可以使用 AIFMD指令第 32a 條中包含的程序隨時終止任何股份類別和/或子基金的此類通知。

為避免疑問,如果您決定投資,即代表您將購買本基金的單位/股份,並不是直接投資於本基金的相關資產。

本文件由富蘭克林鄧普頓投資(亞洲)有限公司發行,並未為香港證監會所審閱。

除非另有註明,所有資料截至上述日期。資料來源:富蘭克林鄧普頓。

CFA® 及Chartered Financial Analyst®為特許金融分析師協會擁有的商標。