跳转到文章内容

Originally published in Stephen Dover’s LinkedIn Newsletter, Global Market Perspectives. Follow Stephen Dover on LinkedIn where he posts his thoughts and comments as well as his Global Market Perspectives newsletter.

On Saturday, President Trump threatened 100% tariffs on “all Canadian goods and products coming into the U.S.A.,” linking the warning to Canada’s China engagement and the risk of Canada becoming a “drop-off port” for Chinese goods into the U.S.

These developments will likely increase market uncertainty and volatility in the near term. Large market moves, however, are unlikely. Since US-Canada trade is crucial to both nations, tensions are likely to ease. Having observed multiple sudden changes in US tariff policy, investors have grown used to these fluctuations and are now focusing on the primary objective of de-escalation.  Notably, this resilience has already been evident in Canada’s financial markets: the Canadian stock market handily outperformed the U.S. and most other global markets in 2025 despite persistent trade noise. The S&P/TSX Composite Index finished the year up 31.7%, reflecting its heavy weighting toward Financials, Energy, and Materials companies that benefited from strong resource demand and elevated commodity prices.1

For long-term investors, an important consideration is the potentially volatile period leading up to the mandatory United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) review on July 1, 2026, as well as the possibility of continued tariff threats being employed as leverage. Should the USMCA not be renewed, significant disruption to investment across North American supply chains may result.

  • USMCA renegotiations remain an underappreciated market risk, particularly for Canada, and Trump’s latest rhetoric is a reminder about how difficult the discussions may be. The July 1, 2026 USMCA joint review will decide if the agreement is extended for 16 years or ends in 2036, as required by its terms.
  • Trade between Canada and the US is the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world. The US is the top global destination for Canadian exports and the third largest source of Canada’s imports. Bilateral trade in goods and services amounted to nearly $1 trillion last year.2
  • Trade is highly asymmetric: Canada’s exports to the US comprise about one fifth of Canadian GDP, whereas US exports to Canada amount to only about 1.5% of US GDP.3
  • The largest traded sectors include energy (oil, gas, electricity), automotive parts, machinery, agriculture, and timber. The latest threat of tariffs therefore could have significant economic impacts on Canada’s economy and key sectors in both countries. A blanket 100% tariff would be costly for the U.S., leading to disruptions in US automobile production and raising prices on many goods sold in the US where consumers are already concerned about affordability (e.g., the costs of electricity, lumber, building materials, and cars).
  •  The tariffs would pose a major negative shock to Canadian GDP due to a probable sharp fall in US demand for Canada’s exports.
  • Accordingly, it is probable that both sides will seek a de-escalation path, while still claiming leverage in the upcoming USMCA talks.
  • This is not just about Canada. A more “surgical” US approach would be for the US to target any re-exports via Canada of Chinese goods. Recent research, however, suggests that such transshipments are small from Canada, though they are larger for Mexico.4 Sectors that are considered most relevant for Chinese transshipment include electrical machinery, automotive parts, and metal products (and potentially EVs).
  • One major uncertainty is how the Supreme Court will rule regarding the use of IEEPA for tariff authority. If the plaintiffs’ case is upheld, the threat of country tariffs will recede. But the threat of tariffs will not completely be removed. The Administration could still shift to sector-based tariffs as well as duties ultimately requiring Congressional approval.
  • The recurring re-escalation of trade and investment tools of US policy will reinforce concerns that other countries could use economic or financial leverage against the US. Dumping US Treasuries can backfire by raising global interest rates or depreciating the dollar. The dollar and Treasury market remain unmatched in legal status, liquidity, and investment benefits. Currently, there is no viable alternative.
  • Nevertheless, limited diversification and hedging may have an impact at the margins—occasionally leading to increased volatility and potentially moderate rises in US risk and term premia, especially in the event that trade or other disputes escalate.
  • Finally, with Democrats now threatening to withhold their Senate support for a funding bill (due to Immigration and Customs Enforcement actions), the odds of another US government shutdown are rising.  The most likely market impact would be a risk-off move (higher volatility, bid for Treasuries). But such shutdowns typically have only modest and short-term impacts on market prices

Investors should watch:  USD/CAD currency and Canada risk proxies (banks/credit), North American autos/industrials with cross-border supply chains, gold, treasuries and term-premium sensitivity in rates.



Copyright ©2025 富蘭克林鄧普頓。版權所有。

本文件僅供一般參考。本文件不應被視作個人投資建議或買賣或持有任何基金股份或證券的要約或招攬。有關本文所提及的任何證券的資料並不足以用作制定投資決策。投資涉及風險。投資價值可升或跌,過往業績不代表或不保證將來的表現。投資收益是以資產淨值計算,已考慮股息再投資及資本增長或損失。投資收益以所示貨幣計價,該等貨幣可能是美元/港元以外的貨幣(「外幣」)。因此,以美元/港元交易的投資者需承受美元/港元與外幣之間匯率波動的風險。投資者應仔細閱讀銷售文件,以獲取進一步資料,包括風險因素。

本文件所載的數據、評論、意見、預測及其他資料如有更改恕不另行通知。不保證投資產品目標將會實現,亦不保證所示預測將會實現。表現亦可能受貨幣波動影響。流動性下降或會對資產價格產生不利影響。貨幣波動可能會影響海外投資的價值。如果投資產品投資於新興市場,風險可能高於投資於已發展市場。如果投資產品投資於衍生工具,則需承擔特定風險,這可能會增加投資產品承受的風險水平。如果投資產品投資於特定行業或地區,回報的波動程度可能高於更多元化的投資產品投資。富蘭克林鄧普頓不就使用本文件或其所載的任何評論、意見或估計而導致的任何直接或間接後果性損失承擔任何責任。在未得到富蘭克林鄧普頓的事先書面同意下,不得以任何方式複製、派發或發表本文件。

名稱中包含「(已對沖)」的任何股份類別將嘗試對沖本基金基礎貨幣與股份類別計值貨幣之間的貨幣風險,但不保證可以成功對沖。在某些情況下,投資者可能涉及額外風險。

若閣下對其中任何資料有疑問,謹請與閣下的財務顧問聯絡。

只適用於UCITS基金: 此外,投資者權利概要可從這裡獲得。根據 UCITS 指令,基金/子基金被通知在不同地區進行營銷。 基金/子基金可以使用 UCITS 指令第 93a 條中包含的程序隨時終止任何股份類別和/或子基金的此類通知。

只適用於AIFMD基金:此外,投資者權利摘要可從這裡獲得。根據 AIFMD 指令,基金/子基金被通知在不同地區進行營銷。 基金/子基金可以使用 AIFMD指令第 32a 條中包含的程序隨時終止任何股份類別和/或子基金的此類通知。

為避免疑問,如果您決定投資,即代表您將購買本基金的單位/股份,並不是直接投資於本基金的相關資產。

本文件由富蘭克林鄧普頓投資(亞洲)有限公司發行,並未為香港證監會所審閱。

除非另有註明,所有資料截至上述日期。資料來源:富蘭克林鄧普頓。

CFA® 及Chartered Financial Analyst®為特許金融分析師協會擁有的商標。