中東局勢升溫：對市場走勢與新興市場的影響 (只提供英文版)

EM Investment-grade bonds initially underperformed, reflecting their longer duration exposure, as US Treasury yields rose across much of the curve. Subsequently, performance converged with high-yield bonds. Within HC sovereign markets, the weakest performers have been higher-risk, energy-importing issuers, including Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Egypt. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), higher energy (especially gas) prices and euro weakness against the USD have weighed on markets, with Romania, Hungary and Poland under pressure. A similar pattern is visible in LC markets, where Hungary, Poland and South Africa have underperformed, primarily as a result of foreign exchange weakness. The Middle East HC bonds have held up surprisingly well in comparison.

Disruption to supply chains and shipping routes have driven the spot price of Brent crude oil. Gas prices rose more sharply, with some futures contracts up in excess of 80%. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz are particularly significant, given that traffic through this strategic chokepoint accounts for approximately 20% of global oil consumption and a substantial share of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports transiting daily. Gas markets have been further destabilised by reduced Qatari production, following Iranian drone attacks on LNG infrastructure at Rass Laffan and Mesaieed. Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura refinery and Iraqi oil and gas installations were also targets.

The renewed surge in energy prices has reignited inflation concerns, contributing to a selloff in US Treasuries. Market participants are reassessing the prospective path of the federal funds rate, and we’ve seen the market scale back the number of US interest-rate cuts it now expects over the next year. For EM central banks, currency depreciation could amplify imported inflation pressures, although the extent to which weaker growth and demand may offset these dynamics remains uncertain.

While the situation remains fluid, we consider the current escalation to represent more than a transient, tactical episode. The breakdown in geopolitical equilibrium appears more analogous to the structural dislocation triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 than to the brief twelve-day Iran–Israel conflict of June 2025. Iran’s reaction function appears less restrained and less predictable, potentially reflecting the leadership vacuum following the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are no longer insulated from escalation, and the conflict has already had impact on both civilian and energy-related assets. The ramifications extend beyond the immediate region, with potential implications for US domestic politics, the trajectory of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, China’s strategic positioning and the outlook for global growth. We believe the impact on pricing will extend beyond the duration of the conflict itself, especially for Middle Eastern issuers, where a structurally higher risk premium may continue to be warranted.

Conclusions and positioning implications

We’ve noted for some time now that EM fundamentals are stronger than in previous crisis episodes. Post-pandemic adjustments have improved FX buffers and macro policy credibility, providing a degree of resilience, which has been evident in the market reaction month-to-date. However, this resilience is conditional on the duration of this conflict and the persistence of elevated oil prices.

The principal downside risk to our base case is an uncontrolled escalation of the conflict in the Middle East, leading to broader disruption of oil supply. Retaliation from non-state actors (such as Hezbollah or the Houthis) would amplify this risk and increase the probability of sustained shipping disruptions. Escalation beyond state-controlled parameters represents the most significant tail risk for markets.

Overall, we believe our portfolio’s tilt towards HC over LC debt should support returns. Our exposure to idiosyncratic stories that are less vulnerable to macro trends and our focus away from the GCC should allow for the strategy’s resilience, in our view.

In sum, markets have reacted, but not yet in a manner consistent with a prolonged disruption scenario; the evolution and duration of the conflict, particularly its impact on energy markets, will be decisive in determining whether this becomes a sustained macro shock. While mindful of downside risks, we continue to look for value in the asset class in the knowledge that geopolitical crises often present opportunities for investors.