Skip to content

Federal Reserve (Fed) Chairman Jerome Powell delivered a very hawkish press conference after the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) raised interest rates by another 50 basis points (bps) in December; financial markets did not buy it.

Powell came into this press conference with two favorable inflation prints in his pocket: the headline Consumer Price Index (CPI) slowed to 7.1% in November from 7.7% in October and 8.2% in September. The November 0.1% month-on-month reading was especially encouraging. Powell noted the improvement, but his tone was very sober and pragmatic. To paraphrase:

  • The Fed has already raised rates by 425 bps this year, moving policy into restrictive territory. It makes sense now to slow the pace of hikes to “feel its way” to the optimal peak rate.
  • Inflation is moving in the right direction, which is encouraging, but…
  • …getting closer to target will take a long time and more policy effort. Goods prices are correcting and housing inflation will slow as new, lower rental contracts feed into the index. But, Powell stressed that the bulk of inflation, that is non-housing core services inflation, is linked to still strong wage growth supported by a labor market which remains “substantially out of balance.” This, the Fed expects, will take a significant amount of time to cool off.
  • Therefore, a strong majority of the FOMC now expects to have to bring the policy interest rate above 5%, and to have to hold it there for a substantial period, until they can feel sufficiently confident that inflation is coming down to target in a sustained manner.

This all makes perfect sense. It’s a very sensible policy approach, predicated on a very pragmatic read of economic trends. The problem is markets have a substantially more bullish view than the Fed. Powell is well aware of this—and that he contributed to this problem with some dovish-sounding statements in a recent speech at Brookings—and tried to push against it with an impressive barrage of hawkish points:

  • The FOMC has repeatedly raised its estimate of the peak fed funds rate for the last several Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) revisions, and might do so again;
  • Monetary policy is not yet restrictive enough;
  • The historical record warns strongly against loosening policy prematurely; and Powell stressed that the Fed’s “dot plot” does not envision any rate cuts in 2023—against market expectations of 50 bps in rate cuts;
  • The Fed has made less progress than it thought on inflation and is therefore ending 2022 with higher inflation than it anticipated;
  • Core inflation is still running at 6%, three times the Fed’s target, and there is not much progress in getting the labor market to cool down and wage growth to slow.

In sum, Powell did all he reasonably could to sound hawkish. Financial markets were unimpressed; after the FOMC meeting, the 10-year US Treasury yield ended lower, the US dollar weakened and equities rallied.

I have noted in previous comments that the Fed has a credibility problem, given that over the past decade and a half it has conditioned markets to expect monetary policy to always support asset prices. Investors have been conditioned into a fear of missing out on a rally at any encouraging datapoint or soundbite. The December FOMC press conference confirmed just how serious the Fed’s credibility problem is.

It’s hard to fault the Fed’s current stance. The only way to overcome this credibility problem would probably be to go overboard on tightening—but that would imply risking a deep(er) recession, something that the Fed is understandably reluctant to do.

The obvious complication is that as financial markets express their total disbelief in the Fed’s rhetoric, they drive financial conditions looser. This will make it harder for the Fed to bring inflation back to target—which in turn makes it even more necessary for the Fed to do what it says it will do; that is, bring rates above 5% and keep them there for longer than the market expects.

To me, the Fed’s read of the economy and inflation outlook seem broadly right (though still optimistic on inflation): the economy remains resilient; there are only tentative signs of weakening in the labor market; and wage growth, core and “sticky” inflation measures are running persistently around 6%. Interest rates across the maturity spectrum are still below current inflation. Bringing inflation down to target will be a hard slog, and the risk of inflation getting entrenched at about 4%-5% is still real. Raising the policy rate above 5% and keeping it there for a while seems quite a realistic view of the kind of policy trajectory that can help achieve the inflation target. But investors no longer believe in a hawkish Fed.

Financial markets seem to have gone from “don’t fight the Fed” to “don’t believe the Fed.” This might turn out to be a self-defeating prophecy. It is most likely a recipe for a lot more volatility.



Copyright ©2025. Franklin Templeton. All rights reserved.

This document is intended to be of general interest only. This document should not be construed as individual investment advice or offer or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any shares of fund. The information provided for any individual security mentioned is not a sufficient basis upon which to make an investment decision. Investments involves risks. Value of investments may go up as well as down and past performance is not an indicator or a guarantee of future performance. The investment returns are calculated on NAV to NAV basis, taking into account of reinvestments and capital gain or loss. The investment returns are denominated in stated currency, which may be a foreign currency other than USD and HKD (“other foreign currency”). US/HK dollar-based investors are therefore exposed to fluctuations in the US/HK dollar / other foreign currency exchange rate. Please refer to the offering documents for further details, including the risk factors.

The data, comments, opinions, estimates and other information contained herein may be subject to change without notice. There is no guarantee that an investment product will meet its objective and any forecasts expressed will be realized. Performance may also be affected by currency fluctuations. Reduced liquidity may have a negative impact on the price of the assets. Currency fluctuations may affect the value of overseas investments. Where an investment product invests in emerging markets, the risks can be greater than in developed markets. Where an investment product invests in derivative instruments, this entails specific risks that may increase the risk profile of the investment product. Where an investment product invests in a specific sector or geographical area, the returns may be more volatile than a more diversified investment product. Franklin Templeton accepts no liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect consequential loss arising from use of this document or any comment, opinion or estimate herein. This document may not be reproduced, distributed or published without prior written permission from Franklin Templeton.

Any share class with “(Hedged)” in its name will attempt to hedge the currency risk between the base currency of the Fund and the currency of the share class, although there can be no guarantee that it will be successful in doing so. In some cases, investors may be subject to additional risks.

Please contact your financial advisor if you are in doubt of any information contained herein.

For UCITS funds only: In addition, a summary of investor rights is available from here. The fund(s)/ sub-fund(s) are notified for marketing in various regions under the UCITS Directive. The fund(s)/ sub-fund(s) can terminate such notifications for any share class and/or sub-fund at any time by using the process contained in Article 93a of the UCITS Directive.

For AIFMD funds only: In addition, a summary of investor rights is available from here. The fund(s)/ sub-fund(s) are notified for marketing in various regions under the AIFMD Directive. The fund(s)/ sub-fund(s) can terminate such notifications for any share class and/or sub-fund at any time by using the process contained in Article 32a of the AIFMD Directive.

For the avoidance of doubt, if you make a decision to invest, you will be buying units/shares in the fund(s)/ sub-fund(s) and will not be investing directly in the underlying assets of the fund(s)/ sub-fund(s).

This document is issued by Franklin Templeton Investments (Asia) Limited and has not been reviewed by the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong.

Unless stated otherwise, all information is as of the date stated above. Source: Franklin Templeton.

CFA® and Chartered Financial Analyst® are trademarks owned by CFA Institute.